Discrete choice models are usually derived from the assumption of random utility maximization. We consider the reverse problem, whether choice probabilities are consistent with maximization of random utilities. This leads to tests that consider the variation in these choice probabilities with the average utilities of the alternatives. By restricting the range of the average utilities we obtain a sequence of tests with fewer maintained hypotheses. In an empirical application, even the weakest test rejects the hypothesis of random utility maximization.
Introduction
Consider an economic agent who must choose one of I alternatives that are indexed by i = 1, . . . , I. We assume that the agent has ranked the I alternatives. This ranking can always be represented by a utility function u i , i = 1, . . . , I with u i the utility of alternative i and u i ≥ u j if and only if i is ranked at least as high as j. In this discrete choice problem, a rational agent chooses the most preferred alternative which is also the alternative that yields the highest level of utility.
Suppose that we observe the choice made by the agent. Can we test whether the agent has made a rational choice, i.e. has chosen the most preferred, utilitymaximizing alternative? If we can observe or measure the utilities u i , then testing for rational behaviour is straightforward. If we have no information on the utilities u i , then any choice can be rationalized by an appropriate choice of the utilities, and only by observing repeated choices with identical utilities of the alternatives can we hope to discover irrational behaviour.
In this paper, we take an intermediate position, because we assume that we have some but limited knowledge of the utilities attached to the alternatives. We assume that this lack of knowledge can be adequately represented by letting the I-vector of utilities be a draw from an I-variate distribution, of which we know the mean. Hence, we can write
where −v i is the known mean of u i , and ε i is a zero mean random variable. Expressing the mean as −v i simplifies conditions that involve cross-derivatives. It is also consistent with the special case that the mean utility is equal to y − p i with y income or total expenditure and p i the price of alternative i (y does not affect the preference ordering and can be omitted). The joint distribution function of the I-vector ε is denoted by F . For the moment we assume that this joint distribution function is known, possibly up to a vector of parameters. The model in equation (1) is the well-known (additive) random utility model. Imperfect knowledge of the utilities of the alternatives makes it harder to predict the behaviour of the agent. In general, the choice made by the agent depends on the realization of the utilities u i , i = 1, . . . , I. If we assume that the agent has a decision rule based on the utilities, then we can derive choice probabilities P i (v), i = 1, . . . , I, that specify the probability that alternative i is chosen for a given decision rule and a given distribution of the utility levels. In particular, we can derive the choice probabilities on the assumption that the agent makes a rational choice, i.e. that he chooses the alternative with the highest level of utility.
By observing choices for a given vector of non-random utility components v we can identify the choice probabilities P i (v), i = 1, . . . , I. If the random components ε i reflect intrapersonal variation in preferences, then we can identify the choice probabilities by observing repeated choices of a single agent. If the random components reflect interpersonal variation in preferences, then identification results from observing choices made by a group of agents with identical non-random utility components v. In econometric practice, we have estimates of the vectors v t , t = 1, . . . , T for T agents, and corresponding estimates of the choice probabilities P i (v t ), i = 1, . . . , I, t = 1, . . . , T . Unbiased estimates of the choice probabilities can be obtained either by stratifying the sample with respect to v t , if the number of distinct values of v t is much smaller than T , or by fitting a flexible functional function, e.g. an unrestricted Nested Multinomial Logit model, to the v t 's and the corresponding observed choices 1 . In the latter case we can extrapolate the choice probabilities outside the set of observed v t 's, to obtain estimates of the choice probabilities in some subset V of IR I . Although econometric practice is an important motivation for this paper, we shall not discuss the details of estimation. We assume throughout that we have estimates of the choice probabilities P i (v), i = 1, . . . , I for v in some subset V of IR I . Given the choice probabilities for v in some subset V of IR I , can we test whether the agents who make these choices are rational, i.e. that on all occasions they choose the alternative with the highest level of utility? In other words, we are interested in necessary and sufficient conditions for the compatibility of choice probabilities with maximization of the random utility function. In this paper we shall derive and discuss such conditions for various choices of V.
The compatibility problem has been studied before. First, there is an analogy with the classical problem of integrability of demand functions. McFadden (1981) explores this analogy which, of course, is not complete, because random utility models do not assume that agents have identical preferences. Second, there is a considerable literature on revealed stochastic preference. A book by Chipman, McFadden, and Richter (1990) surveys this field. An important result is the equivalence of stochastic utility maximization and the strong axiom of revealed stochastic preference (McFadden and Richter (1990) ) that generalizes a classical result of Houthakker (1950) to random choice models. However, there is little overlap between our results and the results in the literature on revealed stochastic preference. The latter literature gives tests for rationality that apply, if the agent's choice is restricted to subsets of the I alternatives. Note the analogy with the classical integrability problem, where demands vary due to changes in prices and total expenditure (or level of utility), i.e. due to changes in the choice set. In our conditions for rational choice, agents choose on all occasions between all I alternatives. However, the I-variate distribution of utility levels differs, either over time between choices of a single agent, or over agents because of differences in the non-random components v. Note that only if v i approaches infinity, alternative i is eliminated from the choice set.
Our results follow on a much smaller set of papers (Williams (1977) , Daly and Zachary (1979) , Börsch-Supan (1990) ). The main advantage of our results is their relevance for econometric practice. In econometric applications there usually is no variation in the choice set, but there is variation in v. We are interested in necessary and sufficient conditions that can lead to econometric tests of the hypothesis of stochastic utility maximization. Although much work remains to be done, we believe that our conditions can be used to construct such tests.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we study the additive random utility model of equation (1). Section 3 contains necessary and sufficient conditions for global compatibility. We also consider perfect aggregation of individual preferences, and ask whether the resulting representative agent model is helpful for studying the compatibility problem. In section 4 we derive conditions for local compatibility for two classes of sets of non-random components V. Section 5 contains an application of the theory to choice of mode of payment. We find that observed choices are not compatible with stochastic utility maximization. Section 6 concludes and gives some directions for future research. Because we try to be comprehensive, we include results that have appeared before. However, we provide new proofs for some of these results, so that the reader may find it worthwhile to reconsider known results.
Additive Random Utility, Stochastic Preferences, and Choice Probabilities
In equation (1) we have specified the basic Additive Random Utility Model (ARUM) that we use to represent the preferences. With respect to the joint distribution function of the random components we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (independence) The joint distribution function of ε does not depend on v for all v ∈ V.
This assumption is empty, if V contains only one element. The independence assumption is analogous to independence assumptions that are routinely made in regression models, including the latent regression models that are used to construct models for limited dependent variables. The independence assumption also allows us to recover F from the choice probabilities, if there is sufficient variation in v 2 . The independence assumption states that the utility of alternative i can be written as the sum of a systematic component −v i and a purely random component ε i .
The other assumptions on the distribution of ε are 
Assumption 3 (non-defectiveness) The joint distribution of ε is non-defective:
A consequence of the assumptions of absolute continuity and non-defectiveness 3 of F is, that
i.e. the probability of ties is 0. An ARUM is defined as a random utility model of the form
Examples where the distribution function F is non-or semi-parametrically estimated are Cosslett (1983) and Klein and Spady (1993) . Manski (1988) discusses nonparametric identification in the case where the choice set consists of only two alternatives.
3 Assumption 3 can be weakened to Pr(ε i = ∞, ε j = ∞) = 0 and Pr(ε i = −∞, ε j = −∞) = 0 for i = j = 1, . . . , I. Allowing e.g. Pr(ε i = ∞) > 0 implies that a fraction of the population will choose i even if v i approaches −∞. We exclude this possibility. In section 4 we shall see that the non-defectiveness assumption becomes empty if V is bounded.
with u, v, and ε I-vectors, and where the distribution function of ε, F , satisfies the independence, absolute continuity and non-defectiveness assumptions. Hence, an ARUM model is characterized by the triple (I, F, V). The ARUM corresponds to a preference ordering over the I alternatives in the case that the agent considers attributes not observed by the econometrician or that his choice is genuinely random. Before we use it as the basic representation of such a preference ordering, we must verify that it does not impose restrictions on the preference ordering.
Consider an agent who must rank I alternatives. Without loss of generality, we can assume that he is not indifferent between any two alternatives. Hence, there are I! possible complete rankings, and each ranking corresponds to a complete, transitive strict preference ordering R. Denote the set of all such strict preference orderings by R. A random preference model assigns probabilities π k to all I! preference orderings in R, i.e. it consists of a pair (R, Π), with Π the (discrete) probability distribution over the I! preference orderings in R. The random preference model is the most basic way to express limited knowledge of the preferences of agents. Hence, it is natural to ask whether the ARUM with a fixed v places restrictions on the random preference model. The answer is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Every ARUM with V = {v} implies a random preference model (R, Π). Conversely, every probability distribution Π over R can be represented by an ARUM with V = {v} for an appropriate choice of F .
Proof See Appendix A.
The attractive feature of random utility models is that they allow for variation in preferences. This variation is either interpersonal or intrapersonal. Psychological theories of choice (Thurstone (1927) , Luce (1959) ) concentrate on intrapersonal variation, i.e. they consider repeated choices by the same individual. Because the ε are assumed to represent idiosyncratic contributions to the utility levels, they are independent between choices. Econometric models of individual choice are usually estimated from cross-section data, in which one choice is observed for each of a number of individuals. In this situation it is most natural think of ε as interpersonal variation in preferences. Usually, the ε are assumed to be independent between individuals. We need repeated choices by a number of individuals to distinguish between the two forms of preference variation.
This paper takes the econometric point of view, and as a consequence, we shall concentrate on interpersonal variation in preferences. In the additive random utility model, this variation can be decomposed into variation in the observed utility components v, and variation in the unobserved utility components ε. The two sources of variation are assumed to be independent. The tests for rational choice that are discussed in the sequel exploit the existence of variation in v that is independent of variation in ε. In tests based on repeated choices by the same individual there is usually no variation in v. Instead, the individual is faced with restricted choice sets. The individual must choose from a subset of all I alternatives and this subset varies between choices (see e.g. McFadden and Richter (1990) ). Although such tests are useful in experimental situations, where one has perfect control over the choice set, they are less useful in econometric applications based on cross-section data. In most econometric studies all individuals face the same choice set. However, the observed utility components v, and, of course, the unobserved utility components ε, differ between individuals. In this situation the tests that are considered below apply.
A rational individual chooses the alternative that yields the highest level of utility. If preferences have the ARUM form, stochastic utility maximization implies that the choice probabilities are given by
The last equality follows from the absolute continuity of F . Note that the choice probabilities in equation (2) are invariant under a common strictly increasing transformation of the utility levels. Hence, the ARUM utility function is an ordinal utility function. Although theorem 1 shows that the ARUM representation does not impose any restriction of the preference ordering, the assumptions 1-3 do impose restrictions. The rest of this section deals with the question whether these assumptions are needed. First we consider assumption 2.
It is well-known that models with a discrete dependent variable may be logically inconsistent. We refer to such a problem as a coherency failure (see e.g. Heckman (1978) , Gourieroux, Laffont, and Montfort (1980) ). A model is incoherent if the mapping from the unobservable random variables to the observable outcome variables is not well-defined, and as a consequence the sum of the probabilities of all outcomes is either strictly less than or greater than 1. In the case of maximization of ARUM preferences, the unobservables are ε, the observable outcome is the chosen alternative and the mapping of ε to {1, . . . , I} is the subscript of argmax(u 1 , . . . , u I ). Now let I = 2, and let F be such that 4 : 
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Next, we discuss the independence assumption. As usual, the routinely, and often implicitly, made independence assumption is hard to justify. It excludes e.g. some forms of heteroscedasticity of the random utility components. We have not found an explicit discussion of this assumption in the literature. McFadden (1981) uses characteristics of the agents to divide the population into homogeneous groups, i.e. groups with the same distribution of ε, and he identifies v with costs associated with the alternatives, making the implicit assumption that costs vary independently of the characteristics of the agents and the alternatives. In general, it seems a good idea to impose some structure on v and to separate systematic variation in the utilities, due to e.g. variation in costs and characteristics of the alternatives, from variation in the characteristics of the agents. Tests for rational choice can then be based on systematic variation in the utilities. By stratification on the characteristics of the agents we obtain in each stratum the distribution of ε becomes hopefully independent of v. This approach may not work in all cases, and it is tempting to generalize the ARUM to allow for arbitrary dependence of ε on v. It is easily seen that this is not possible without affecting some obvious properties of choice probabilities.
Without loss of generality we set I = 2. The utilities of the two alternatives are
where the joint distribution of ε may depend on v. The absolute continuity and non-defectiveness assumptions are maintained. The choice probability of alternative 1 is
with H the distribution function of ε 2 − ε 1 which may depend on v. From equation (3) it is obvious that the choice of a rational agent is not affected by the addition of a common constant to the non-random utility components. Thus for all c ∈ IR 
where η has a joint distribution function G that does not depend on x, and β and x i are non-stochastic. We can write equation (5) in the ARUM form
alone. So we do not expect that choice probabilities are translation invariant which is confirmed by
which is clearly not translation invariant. Although this example does not prove that a generalization to models that allow for dependence of ε on v is impossible, it shows that such a generalization has pitfalls.
3 Global Compatibility with Stochastic Utility Maximization
Global Compatibility in Discrete Choice Models
In this section we present a simple derivation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the compatibility of choice probabilities P i (v), i = 1, . . . , I with stochastic utility maximization. We shall assume that v can take any value in IR I . The necessary and sufficient conditions were first given by Daly and Zachary (1979) . The simple arguments given here are also helpful in understanding later sections of this paper.
First, we define global compatibility with stochastic utility maximization. Here, and in the rest of this paper, stochastic utility maximization means maximization of preferences of ARUM form.
Definition 1 The set of choice probabilities
P i (v), i = 1, . .
. , I is globally compatible with stochastic utility maximization, if for all v ∈ IR
I we can write 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for global compatibility.
For all v ∈ IR I :
is differentiable with respect to v i and
In condition (C-4), as well as in the sequel,
These conditions are known in the literature as the Daly-Zachary or Daly-Zachary-Williams conditions.
Theorem 3 (Daly and Zachary) Conditions (C-1)-(C-5) are necessary and sufficient for global compatibility with stochastic utility maximization.
Before proving this theorem, we give an interpretation of these conditions. The first condition states that all choice probabilities are non-negative and that some alternative is chosen. According to (C-2), only the differences in average utilities determine the choice probabilities, not the absolute levels. This does not imply that utility is cardinal. If the utilities u i are transformed by some monotonically increasing function, the same choice probabilities are obtained. The third condition requires that an alternative is chosen with probability 1, if its utility increases without bound. Condition (C-4) states that if all alternatives, except the i-th, become less attractive, the probability of choosing the i-th alternative should not decrease. Finally, (C-5) is the discrete choice analogue of the symmetry condition in demand analysis.
Proof (Necessity) (C-1) follows directly from the uniqueness (with probability one) of the utility maximizing choice. Translation invariance is a direct consequence of equation (6). The non-defectiveness of the distribution of ε implies (C-3). The differentiability almost everywhere and non-negativity follow from equation (2) and the absolute continuity of the distribution of ε. Finally, we have
where the second equality is obtained by the change of variable
(Sufficiency) Translation invariance implies that we can write
with H i a function defined on
Because of (C-4) and equation (7) h i exists and is non-negative on IR (I−1) . Moreover
Note that from (C-5) for i = j and all v ∈ IR
Comparison of equation (9) and equation (6) indicates that we must show that there exists a random I-vector ε with an absolutely continuous and non-defective distribution such that for i = 1, . . . , I
has density function h i . Let k be an arbitrary non-defective density function and specify the distribution function of ε by
The corresponding density function is, of course,
Note that in the construction of F and f we started from 1 as a 'reference alternative'. A transformation of ε to w 1 and ε 1 shows that ε 1 − ε 1 ι I−1 has density function h 1 (and the density function of ε 1 is k). We need to show that ε i − ε i ι I−1 has density function h i for i = 2, . . . , I. Without loss of generality we choose i = I (if necessary, we re-label the alternatives). Now consider the transformation from ε to η 1 = ε 1 − ε I . . .
The corresponding density function of η is
It is easily seen that equation (10) implies that
Setting η I = 0 and substituting in equation (11) gives
Integrating out η I shows that ε I − ε I ι I−1 has density function h I . The distribution of ε is absolutely continuous by construction (and the marginal distribution of ε 1 is by construction non-defective). It is also nondefective, because
and, hence from (C-3)
where the latter equality follows from
Remark 1
The definition of global compatibility implies that there exists a stochastic I-vector ε that satisfies equation (6). The proof shows that the choice of ε is not unique. The choice probabilities determine h 1 , and by equation (10) also h 2 , . . . , h I . In other words, they determine the distributions of
g. the distribution of ε 1 , can be chosen arbitrarily. From equation (10) it follows that any one of the h i determines all the other h i 's. For I = 2 this expression reduces to
i.e., h 2 is obtained by reflection of h 1 around 0. Daly and Zachary (1979) paper does not contain a proof. The only published proof is that by McFadden (1981) (see his Theorem 5.1, assertion 3, pp. 212-213, and the proof in the Appendix 5.23). McFadden uses the same construction of the distribution function of ε, i.e. using alternative 1 as a reference alternative (see (5.131), p. 263). This establishes directly that
Remark 2 The original
Next, he proves that equation (12) holds for i = 1, . . . , I, by showing that the choice probabilities can be obtained as minus the gradient with respect to v of a function, the Social Surplus function that, can be defined using F (see (5.132), p. 264). These derivatives have the form of equation (2). Implicitly, this establishes that the choice of 1 as a reference alternative is arbitrary. Our proof is more direct, because we need not establish the existence and differentiability of a Social Surplus function. Instead, we make direct use of the symmetry condition (C-5) to show that the choice of the reference alternative is arbitrary. Our method of proof can be easily adapted to derive conditions for local compatibility.
Remark 3 Using theorem 3 we can make a rather surprising observation. Assume that the population of agents consists of two sub-populations. Fraction p chooses an alternative by maximizing a (random) utility function. Fraction 1 − p picks an alternative at random. The choice probabilities for the whole population are
Hence, although only a fraction p of the agents makes a rational choice, the population choice probabilities are compatible with stochastic utility maximization.
Remark 4
The (multinomial) logit and the (multinomial) probit models satisfy the conditions for global compatibility for all values of their parameters. The Nested Multinomial Logit model satisfies (C-1), (C-2), (C-3) and (C-5) for all parameter values and (C-4) only if the association parameter is in the (0, 1] interval (see the example in section 5).
If we let v ikl be a k-subvector of v i , and l = 1, . . . ,
, it is not difficult to see that (C-4) can be replaced by
Hence, we have
Corollary 1 Conditions (C-1), (C-2), (C-3), (C'-4), and (C-5) are necessary and sufficient for global compatibility with stochastic utility maximization.
The proof of theorem 3 contains a further useful corollary. 
Corollary 2 The choice probabilities
and
By a change of variables we obtain a third corollary. 
Corollary 3 The choice probabilities
This corollary implies that the specification of one density function is sufficient to determine all choice probabilities. This density function is the density function of the (I − 1)-vector (ε 2 − ε 1 , . . . , ε I − ε 1 ) , where the first alternative is arbitrarily taken as a reference alternative.
A Comparison Between the Daly-Zachary Conditions and the Conditions for the Integrability of Demand Systems
The conditions (C-1), (C-4) and (C-5) resemble conditions that demand functions must satisfy to be compatible with utility maximization. It is well known that demand functions are compatible with utility maximization, if they have certain properties (see for instance Varian (1984) ), as symmetry and non-negative definiteness of the Slutsky matrix. It is of interest to see how these properties compare to the Daly-Zachary conditions (C-1)-(C-5) above. For the sake of the analogy, we interpret v as the prices of the alternatives. We shall use some results of McFadden (1981) to derive a representative agent model that yields the choice probabilities as the demand functions in a continuous choice problem. We rewrite equation (1) as
In equation (17) the subscript t refers to the t-th agent, y t is his total expenditure and p is the price of other consumption expenditures. Note that adding yt p does not affect the choice made by the agent. The only change in equation (1) is that we take the price of i relative to the price of other consumption. The representative agent has the following indirect utility and cost function:
withȳ the arithmetic average of the total expenditures. The expectation is taken over the distribution of ε. Using similar arguments as McFadden (1981) we can show that equation (18) 
and the Marshallian demand for the other consumption is
In these expressions P is the I-vector of choice probabilities. The integrability conditions that the demand functions (20) must satisfy are
If we compare these conditions with conditions (C-1)-(C-5) above, it is seen that translation invariance is not implied by equation (21) and equation (22). Moreover, equations (21) and (22) yield weaker restrictions on the choice probabilities than the symmetry condition (C-4) and the non-negativity condition (C-5) as the following example with the choice between two alternatives (I = 2) demonstrates. The Slutsky condition (22) requires that the matrix   
6 Note that
is negative semi-definite. In particular, the diagonal elements must be nonpositive. The non-negativity condition (C-4) on the other hand requires that
Since P 1 (v) + P 2 (v) = 1 and because of the symmetry condition (C-5) we have
Hence, the Daly-Zachary-Williams conditions imply that the matrix in equation (23) is negative semi-definite and symmetric, that the off-diagonal elements are non-negative, and that the rows and columns of this matrix sum to 0. These conditions are stronger than the ones imposed by the integrability conditions (21) and (22). We conclude that compatibility with utility maximization by a representative agent yields weaker conditions on the choice probabilities than compatibility with individual utility maximization.
Local Compatibility with Stochastic Utility Maximization
In the definition of global compatibility the observed utility components v can take any value in IR I . In local compatibility v is restricted to a subset of IR I . Of course, local compatibility is weaker than global compatibility.
Definition 2 The set of choice probabilities
. , I is locally compatible with stochastic utility maximization on a set V ⊂ IR
I , if for i = 1, . . . , I and all v ∈ V we can write
with ε a stochastic I-vector with a non-defective and absolutely continuous distribution that does not depend on v.
Local compatibility was introduced in Börsch-Supan (1990) , although this work does not give a formal definition of the concept. Local compatibility is closer to econometric practice than global compatibility. In practice, v does not take on all values in IR I , but we usually have a finite number of observed v t , t = 1, . . . , T . We specify choice probabilities, and ask whether these choice probabilities are consistent with utility maximization on a set V with v t ∈ V for t = 1, . . . , T . In Börsch-Supan's study the choice probabilities are obtained by fitting a flexible parametric functional form, the Nested Multinomial Logit model (NMNL), to the observed v t and the corresponding observed choices. If the association parameters of the NMNL model are outside the (0, 1] interval, condition (C-4) is violated. The other conditions for compatibility are satisfied for all parameter values (Börsch-Supan (1990) ). Hence, the NMNL model is not globally compatible if a dissimilarity parameter is outside the (0, 1] interval.
Now choose a, b ∈ IR
I such that a ≤ v t ≤ b for t = 1, . . . , T . We can ask under which conditions the fitted choice probabilities are locally compatible with stochastic utility maximization on V = [a, b] 7 . The following theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions. Remark 5 This result is stronger than that obtained in Börsch-Supan (1990) . First, we do not require that (C-1), (C-2) and (C-5) are globally satisfied. Second, the theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions. Third, Börsch-Supan does not prove local compatibility as defined above. His suggested distribution of ( ε 2 − ε 1 . . . ε I − ε 1 ) is not absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, and he does not indicate how the resulting ties will be resolved. The construction in appendix B yields an absolutely continuous distribution of ε. The proof uses the representation of the choice probabilities of corollary 3 of theorem 3. We find a density function h * 1 that satisfies this equation for all v ∈ [a, b].
Remark 6 Condition (C-3) is not required for local compatibility. Since equation (25) only has to be satisfied on an interval, we have more freedom in choosing the distribution of ε. In particular, we can always choose it to be non-defective.
Remark 7
The conditions in theorem 4 and corollary 1 of theorem 3 are identical, except for (C-3).
Theorem 4 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for local compatibility on an interval. It is natural to ask whether these conditions are necessary and sufficient for local compatibility on arbitrary sets V. The following simple example shows that this is not true.
We consider choice between two alternatives, i.e. I = 2. Let us assume that the choice probabilities are translation invariant, and differentiable, i.e. (C-1), (C-2) and the first part of (C'-4) are satisfied. Then for I = 2 (C-5) is also satisfied 8 . The choice probabilities P 1 (v) and P 2 (v) can be expressed as
Strictly, local compatibility on a bounded interval is not possible: if equation (25) (8). Let h 1 and P 1 , defined in equation (7), be as in figure 1 .
Note that h 1 is non-negative onṼ 1 = (−∞, w 0 ] ∪ [w 1 , ∞). However, it is not possible to find a density function h * 1 that coincides with h 1 onṼ 1 and also satisfies
The obvious problem is that P 1 (0, w 1 ) < P 1 (0, w 0 ) and this implies that h * 1 has to be negative for some values of w. We conclude that the non-negativity condition in (C'-4) is not sufficient for local compatibility on more general sets than intervals.
In this simple example it is not difficult to find setsṼ on which the choice probabilities are locally compatible. From figure 1 we see that local compatibility holds on eitherṼ 2 = (−∞,
9 . Actually, local compatibility holds on setsṼ 4 = (−∞, w ] ∪ [w , ∞) if and only if 
Note that condition (26) does not preclude that w 0 ≤ v 2t − v 1t ≤ w 1 for some t. In other words, theorem 4 is also not necessary for local compatibility of the observed choice probabilities. We conclude that if one has observed utilities v t , t = 1, . . . , T , it is restrictive to investigate local compatibility by finding a 2 and b 2 such that a 2 ≤ v 2t − v 1t ≤ b 2 and checking whether theorem 4 holds for
Is it possible to find necessary and sufficient conditions for other choices of V? We shall consider a choice of V that can be seen as the opposite extreme, namely a finite set of distinct points. This choice of V is of considerable practical interest, because in practice an econometrician has a finite sample V = {v 1 , . . . , v T } of observed average utilities. If for every v t he observes a large number of choices made by distinct agents, he can determine the corresponding choice probabilities P i (v t ), i = 1, . . . , I. If the number of observed choices for each t is small, he can use either a local averaging method, e.g. a kernel estimate, or a flexible functional form, e.g. the NMNL model, to estimate P i (v t ), i = 1, . . . , I, t = 1, . . . , T . How can he decide whether these (estimated) choice probabilities are (locally) compatible with stochastic utility maximization (on V)? In theorem 5 we give necessary and sufficient conditions for local compatibility on a set that consists of a finite number of distinct points in IR I . The derivation of these conditions is facilitated by some additional notation. By a change of variables as in corollary 3 we see that, if choices are made by stochastic utility maximization, choice probabilities can be written as
In this formulation, alternative 1 is chosen as the reference alternative. Each observation v t induces a partition of IR
For a given sample v t , t = 1, . . . , T , we define the sets C as the intersections:
for all (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i T ) in the index set
The sets C i1i2···iT will be empty for many combinations of
Furthermore, note that each set B i (v t ) can be written as the union of sets C:
where the index set J i (v t ) is given by
. . , I, s = 1, . . . , T, s = t} .
From now on, we restrict ourselves to those sets C which are not empty, i.e. those belonging to
The corresponding index set is J * , i.e.,
The collection C is a partition of IR (I−1) : the sets in C are disjoint and the union of all sets in C is IR (I−1) . Using this, we can rewrite each observed choice probability as
where
Now we are in a position to give a necessary and sufficient condition for local compatibility of the choice probabilities on V:
Theorem 5 
. , v T } if and only if condition (C-1) holds on V and the system of equations in A i1i2···iT
P i (v t ) = (i1,i2,...,iT )∈J * i (vt) A i1i2···iT (30) t = 1, . . . , T, i = 1, .
. . , I has a non-negative solution.
Proof (Necessity) It is clear from equation (28) and equation (29) that all A's will be non-negative if a non-negative generating density function h 1 exists.
(Sufficiency) Suppose the set of equations (30) has a non-negative solution. It follows from equation (29) that we can construct a non-negative density h 1 (w) which generates the observed choice probabilities. Take for (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i T ) ∈ J * a non-negative function g i1i2···iT , such that:
One can choose
with φ(·) the standard normal density function. We define h * 1 by
It is clear that h * 1 is non-negative and that for i = 1, . . . , I, t = 1, . . . , T :
If the density of ε is
then the choice probabilities can be written as in equation (25). From equation (31) it follows that we can choose the distribution of ε to be absolutely continuous and non-defective.
Remark 8
The existence of a solution to equation (30) implies that the choice probabilities are translation invariant. However, conditions (C-3) and (C-5) are not needed. If (C-4) holds for all v, then equation (30) has a non-negative solution.
Remark 9
The equation system in equation (30) As a corollary to theorem 5, we give a necessary condition on the choice probabilities that can be checked easily.
Corollary 4 If the choice probabilities P i (v) are compatible with stochastic utility maximization, then for each pair (t, t ):
If I = 3, it is easily seen that each pair of points (t, t ) yields two restrictions of the form (32) (see also figure 2). Hence with T observations there will be T × (T − 1) restrictions like (32). If condition (32) is violated for some pair (t, t ), one can conclude that the choice probabilities are not locally compatible with stochastic utility maximization. If I = 2, the condition of corollary 4 guarantees that the distribution function of ε 2 − ε 1 is non-decreasing in v 2t − v 1t , t = 1, . . . , T as, of course, it should be. For I = 2 the condition of corollary 4 is also sufficient for local compatibility with stochastic utility maximization. This result, however, does not generalize to more alternatives, as the following example illustrates 10 . Example Consider the case I = 3, T = 3. Let the first alternative be the reference alternative, and let v 1 t − v 1t ι 2 be denoted byw t . The pointsw 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 and the integration region of the corresponding choice probabilities are given in figure 2. The integration regions are decomposed in sets C i1i2i3 defined in equation (27) . Let the corresponding vectors of choice probabilities be P (v 1 ) = (0, 0, 1) , P (v 2 ) = (0, 1, 0) and P (v 3 ) = (1, 0, 0) , which satisfy condition (C-1).
One can easily check that the observed choice probabilities satisfy the condition of corollary 4:
10 We owe this example to Jan Karel Lenstra. 
-
However, the observed choice probabilities do not satisfy the condition of theorem 5. The set of equations If we compare theorems 3, 4 and 5, we can make a number of observations. First, globally compatible choice probabilities are locally compatible on any bounded interval and also locally compatible on every finite set. Choice probabilities that are locally compatible on an interval are also locally compatible on any finite subset of that interval. Second, the number of conditions diminishes if the 'measure' of V becomes smaller. In theorem 4 we do not need (C-3) and the condition (30) in theorem 5 is implied by the the non-negativity condition (C-4). The symmetry condition (C-5) is not needed for and is not implied by local compatibility on a finite set. Translation invariance is implicit in the condition of theorem 5. Third, if the 'measure' of V becomes smaller the freedom in choosing the distribution of ε increases. Hence, it becomes easier to satisfy the compatibility conditions. Finally, we have not considered the case that V is the union of a number of disjoint intervals. We conjecture that the necessary and sufficient conditions for that case are that the conditions of theorem 4 hold for every bounded interval and that for every subset of V the conditions of theorem 5 are satisfied.
An Application: Choice of Mode of Payment
In this section we illustrate the theory in this paper by examining the choice of mode of payment. Since our aim here is only to illustrate the theory in this paper, we are very brief in describing the empirical analysis. The interested reader is referred to Koning and Ridder (1999) for details.
When someone pays for an over-the-counter purchase, he has the choice between different modes of payment. We distinguish between payment using a giro cheque, a bank cheque, or payment in cash. The alternatives will be labelled 1, 2, 3 in this order. The choice between these alternatives is modeled by assuming the existence of an indirect utility function ν (Y, p; ζ) , with Y denoting income, p relative prices and ζ preferences parameters. Furthermore, payment mode i has transaction costs T i (AM T ) and we assume that these costs vary with the amount of the transaction. The agent is assumed to choose the alternative that maximizes the indirect utility function ν(Y − T i (AM T ), p; ζ). This utility is parameterized as (see also equation (1))
The index t refers to the individual making the decision.
Our dataset consists of 225 observations of transactions 11 . For each trans-action the mode of payment is recorded, as well as the amount paid, size of the household, age of the head of the household, sex of the person making the transaction, and household income. All variables are generic: they do not vary with the alternative chosen. Out of the 225 transactions, 186 were made using cash as mode of payment, 20 using a giro cheque and 19 using a bank cheque. We model choice of payment using the nested multinomial logit model, with the choice probabilities given by
The parameter θ is known as the association parameter, and 1 − θ is approximately equal to the correlation coefficient between ε 1 and ε 2 . We choose alternative 1 to be the reference alternative, so we set v 1 = 0 for all observations. The density function of the random utility components ( η 1 η 2 ) = ( ε 2 − ε 1 ε 3 − ε 1 ) which leads the choice probabilities (33) is given by
It is easily checked that the NMNL-specification of the choice probabilities satisfies all conditions (C-1), (C-2), (C-3) and (C-5) for all values of (η 1 , η 2 ). Condition (C-4) is satisfied for all (η 1 , η 2 ) ∈ IR 2 if and only if this density function is nonnegative. This density is nonnegative for all values η ∈ IR 2 if and only if 0 < θ ≤ 1.
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood and the estimated utilities figure 3 . The estimated value of θ is −1.93. The curve drawn in figure 3 12 is defined implicitly by h 1 (η 1 , η 2 ) = 0; h 1 (·, ·) is negative beneath the curve. Now we proceed to check whether the observed utility components and the choice probabilities satisfy the requirements for compatibility with stochastic recorded for one household we have randomly selected one.
12 We ignore the variation in the estimated average utilities due to sampling variation in the parameter estimates. This sampling variation is an order of magnitude smaller than that induced by the variation in the regressors, and ignoring it does not change the conclusions. The estimated value of θ is outside of this interval, so we reject the hypothesis of global compatibility. According to theorem 4, the choice probabilities are locally compatible on a closed interval if (C-1), (C-2), (C'-4), and (C-5) hold on that interval. In figure 3 however it is clear that a substantial number of observations are located in the area where h 1 (·, ·) is negative. Hence, the model is not locally compatible with stochastic utility maximization on a closed interval either. Finally, we check whether the observed choice probabilities are compatible with utility maximization on the finite set of estimated utility components V = {v 1 , . . . , v T } where the index refers to the observation. Appendix C gives an example where NMNL choice probabilities are not compatible on an interval, but are compatible on a finite set. Because of the computational complexity of the system of equations (30) of theorem 5, we check the necessary condition of corollary 4 first. It turns out that this necessary condition for compatibility on a finite set is rejected in 6.02% of all comparisons. For comparison we note that in figure 3 92% of the estimated utility components are in the area where h 1 is negative. The necessary condition for compatibility of corollary 4 is clearly less stringent than the conditions required for compatibility on an interval. If we delete the pairs that reject condition 4 and re-estimate the model, the estimate for θ increase but is still negative. In the re-estimated model, there are still pairs of observations left that reject the necessary condition.
We conclude that the estimated model is not compatible with stochastic utility maximization. Of course, this conclusion may be caused by misspecification of the indirect utility function ν, or by misspecification of the distribution of the random components η. It turns out that the conclusions we reach are not sensitive to the inclusion of different explanatory variables, or to transformations of the explanatory variables. In Koning and Ridder (1999) we estimate a model in which both types of cheques are grouped into one category so that the choice model concerns two alternatives only. The relation between the utility index and the choice probability is then estimated non-parametrically using kernel estimation. According to equation (26) a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility is that the choice probability is non-decreasing in its argument. This, however, is rejected in the data, which again provides evidence against compatibility with utility maximization for this particular empirical example.
Conclusion
The conditions in the theorems 3, 4, 5 can be used to construct rationality tests in discrete choice problems. The tests based on theorems 3 and 4 require the estimation of the choice probabilities for choices that are not observed in the data. In general, this is achieved by fitting a smooth and sufficiently flexible set of functions to the observed choices. The test of theorem 3 is completely based on the properties of these functions, which in the case of the Nested Multinomial Logit model can be summarized by a few parameters. For the test of theorem 4 we consider properties of these functions on a restricted domain that is determined by the range of average utility differences. Even in the case of the NMNL model the null hypothesis can no longer be expressed as a restriction on the parameters. The test of theorem 5 does not require extrapolation of the choice probabilities for average utilities that are not observed. This test has no maintained assumptions beyond those of the ARUM. Hence, it may come as a surprise that even this test has sufficient power to reject random utility maximization in an empirical example.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof Consider an ARUM with non-random utility components v. Let R k be an arbitrary complete and transitive strict preference ordering of the I alternatives. Hence, R k can be written as
Because the distribution of ε, and as a consequence, that of u, is absolutely continuous and non-defective, we have that
and, hence
Next, we prove the reverse assertion. If I = 2, the ARUM with non-random utility components (v 1 , v 2 ) assigns Pr(ε 2 − ε 1 < v 2 − v 1 ) = π 12 to the event that alternative 1 is strictly preferred over alternative 2. Hence, if we choose
, with π 12 the probability that 1 is strictly preferred over 2, π 21 = 1 − π 12 , and φ the standard normal density function, then it is easily seen that the ARUM with this joint density function of (ε 1 , ε 2 ) yields the probability distribution Π over the two strict preference orderings. Next, we consider I = 3. The six possible preference orderings and associated probabilities are given in table A-1. An ARUM with the given non-random utility components v assigns utility levels
to the three alternatives. According to the ARUM, the strict preference orderings in the first column of 
integrals over the indicated regions are equal to these probabilities. Note that we only have to find a joint density function of (ε 2 − ε 1 , ε 3 − ε 1 ) , because all events can be expressed in terms of these two random variables. The integration regions in the third column of table A-1 are show in figure A-1. Let h, the joint density function of (w 1 , w 2 ) , be given by
with φ the standard normal density function. Then h is clearly a proper density function and we have:
It is obvious that if we choose the joint density function of (ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 )
then the ARUM in equation (A-1) with this joint distribution yields the random preference model with probability distribution Π over the six strict preference orderings. For I ≥ 4, let R k , k = 1, . . . , I! be all strict preference orderings of the I alternatives. Strict preference ordering R k gives a complete ranking of the I alternatives
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Note that
Hence, it is obvious that
From equation (A-2) we see thatε ∈ D k , and we conclude that
The ARUM that assigns probabilities π k to the strict preference ordering R k , k = 1, . . . , I! has a joint density function of ε that can be constructed as follows. Define the density function
From equation (A-3) and equation (A-4) it follows that this is a proper density function. The joint density function of ε is: 
] (C-1), (C-2), (C'-4) and (C-5) hold.
A modified version of this theorem has been stated by Börsch-Supan (1990) . Börsch-Supan states and proves this theorem only for the sufficiency part. However, since we require F (ε) to be absolutely continuous, we are able to prove that the conditions are necessary as well. In the remainder of this section, we first show that Börsch-Supan's construction does not satisfy our definition of local compatibility, and we provide an alternative proof.
Note that we can weaken the conditions somewhat: from the proof it follows that symmetry only has to hold for a ≤ v ≤ b. Translation invariance implies that we can replace the interval [a, b] by
Börsch-Supan's proof of this theorem is not correct. His proof starts from the representation
with h 1 defined as
, a function defined on IR (I−1) . Note that h 1 is not a density function because for some v ∈ IR I we have that
that is, all observed choice probabilities are generated by the density h * 1 . In equation (B-1), h * 1 (w) ≥ 0 for all w ∈ IR (I −1) . However, his suggestion for h * 1 does not satisfy equation (B-1). To see this, first note that if a ≤ v ≤ b, then
In the sequel we consider the case I = 3.
In equation (24), p. 382, Börsch-Supan suggests to define h * 1 by
0 o t h e r w i s e .
(B-3)
Because h * 1 is a density function with respect to Lebesgue measure, an equivalent density function is given by
ot h e rw i s e .
(B-4)
The density functions in equations (B-3) and (B-4) are equivalent because they differ on a set of Lebesgue measure 0. It is immediately clear that for a ≤ v ≤ b
on the boundary of [a, b] ). We conclude that Börsch-Supan's construction does not satisfy equation (B-1). The problem is that he changes the value of a density function on a set of Lebesgue measure 0. For a correct proof we must find a density function h * 1 that satisfies equation (B-1). If the density function of the I-vector ε is chosen as
with corresponding distribution function F * (ε), and k an arbitrary density function, then P 1 (v) can be expressed as in equation (B-1). For all v ∈ V and i = 2, . . . , I the density function h
Hence, if we can find a density function h * 1 such that for all v ∈ V the choice probabilities P 1 (v) and P i (v), i = 2, . . . , I can be expressed as in equations (B-1) and (B-5), then theorem 4 is proved. Note that, by a change of variables and due to the symmetry condition, we can write the choice probabilities P i (v), i = 2, . . . , I for all v ∈ IR I as
However, h 1 is not a density function. Proof (Necessity) Since F (ε) is by assumption absolutely continuous, we have for all v ∈ V:
which implies that all mixed partial derivatives exist almost everywhere and can be chosen to be non-negative everywhere.
(Sufficiency) We prove the theorem for I = 3. The proofs for I = 4, 5, . . . are notationally involved, but are completely analogous. From figure B-1 we see
We consider the four terms of equation (B-7) in turn. Because
there is a density function g 1 with
For the second term let f 2 be an arbitrary non-negative function with
We have
Hence, the integrand in equation (B-9) is non-negative. The third term is rewritten analogously. Let f 1 be an arbitrary non-negative function with Note that h * 1 integrates to 1, because P 1 + P 2 + P 3 = 1. Hence, h * 1 is a density function. It is clear that F * (ε) can be chosen to be absolutely continuous, due to the freedom we have in choosing g 1 (w), g 2 (w), etc.
C Compatibility on a Finite Set But Not on an Interval
In this section we apply the necessary and sufficient conditions of theorem 5 to choice probabilities that are generated by an NMNL model and we show that choice probabilities may be compatible on a finite set but not on an interval. To be specific the choice probabilities at the observed utility components v t , t = 1, . . . , T are given by the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model of McFadden (1978) (see also Maddala (1983) , pp. 67-69). We consider an NMNL model with three alternatives (I = 3). The joint distribution of the random components of the utilities is necessary condition of corollary 4. This is, of course, due to the negativity of the density function in B 2 (v 4 ) \ B 2 (v 3 ). It is no longer possible to find a density function h 1 (w) which could have generated the observed choice probabilities.
